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NOVEL METHODS FOR ENABLING PUBLIC KEY SCHEMES IN FUTURE MOBILE SYSTEMS 
N. Komninos, B. Honary 
Lancaster University (UK)
ABSTRACT
It  is  essential  to  enable  public  key schemes  in  future 
mobile  systems  to  solve  current  problems  in 
authentication  and  key  management  for  end-to-end 
security.  In this paper, we propose new procedures for 
enabling public key schemes in future mobile terminals. 
The  proposed  procedures  are  based  on  the  complex 
public key computations that can be performed either in 
the SIM card or in the terminal itself.  Multiple crypto-
processors are also used to decrease the processing time 
required  to  perform  the  complex  public  key 
computations.  
INTRODUCTION
The security mechanisms of current mobile systems (i.e. 
GSM)  are  implemented  in  three  different  system 
elements;  the  subscriber  identification  module  (SIM), 
the mobile station (MS), and the mobile network.  The 
SIM  contains  the  international  mobile  subscriber 
identity (IMSI), the individual subscriber authentication 
key (Ki), the ciphering key generating algorithm (A8), 
the authentication algorithm (A3), as well as a personal 
identification  number  (PIN).   The  MS  contains  the 
ciphering algorithm (A5).  The algorithms A3, A5, and 
A8  are  also  present  in  the  GSM  network.   The 
authentication centre (AUC) consists  of a  database of 
identification  and  authentication  information  for 
subscribers.  This information consists of the IMSI, the 
temporarily  MSI  (TMSI),  the  location  area  identity 
(LAI), and the Ki for each user [1).   In order for the 
authentication and security mechanisms to function, all 
three  elements  (SIM,  MS,  network)  are  required  as 
shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 -- Secure Structure of GSM Network
Moreover,  MS  are  activated  by  the  SIM  card.   By 
inserting  the  card  into  any  mobile  telephone  and 
entering the correct PIN password, MS is registered to 
network  and  all  calls  are  charged  to  the  SIM  card 
owner.  Such a SIM card has a micro central processing 
unit  (CPU),  a  random access memory (RAM),  a  read 
only  memory  (ROM),  and  an  electrically  erasable 
programmable read only memory (EEPROM) chip.
The memory available in the SIM cards and general in 
integrated circuits, such as smart cards, brings enormous 
flexibility to the storage allocation as shown in Table 1. 
There  are  a  number  of  smart  cards  available  on  the 
market  today  that  provide  security  services  for 
electronic commerce purposes.  Public key generation, 
digital  signatures,  and key distribution protocols  have 
already  been  implemented  by  some  vendors  such  as 
Certicom  (SC-500  model  with  RSA/DSA/ECC  key 
generation,  RSA/DSA/ECDSA  signature, 
RSA/DH/ECDH key agreement) (4).
Memory Typical Maximum
ROM 8 – 16 kBytes 32 kBytes
EEPROM 2 – 8 kBytes 16 kBytes
RAM 128 – 256 Bytes 512 – 1000 Bytes
Table 1 – Memory Sizes
Nowadays,  RSA  signatures  and  verifications  are 
supported with a choice of 512, 768, or 1024 bit  key 
lengths.   The  algorithms  typically  use  the  Chinese 
Remainder  Theorem (CRT)  in  order  to  speed  up  the 
processing.  Even at the 1024 bit key length, the time 
needed  to  perform a  signature  is  typically  under  one 
second.   Usually  the  EEPROM file  that  contains  the 
private  key  is  designed  such  that  the  sensitive  key 
material  never  leaves  the  chip.   Even  the  cardholder 
can’t access the key material in this case.  The usage of 
the private key is protected by the user’s PIN, so that 
possession of the card does not imply the ability to sign 
with  the  card.   RSA’s  public  key  cryptography 
standards (PKCS#1) padding is  implemented in  some 
cards.  The Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) is less 
widely  implemented  than  RSA.  When  it  is 
implemented,  it  is  typically found only at  the 512 bit 
key length.
Even  though smart  cards  have the ability  to  generate 
public key pairs, this can be very slow.  Typical times 
needed  for  a  1024  bit  RSA  key  pair  ranges  from  8 
seconds to 3 minutes.  The larger times violate the ISO 
specifications  for  communications  timeout  so 
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specialized  hardware,  such  as  co-processors,  is 
sometimes  necessary.   The  lack  of  computing  power 
implies a relatively weak random number source as well 
as relatively weak algorithms for selecting large prime 
numbers, which results in bad quality of the key pairs.
SECURE INFRASTRUCTURE
Public  key  schemes  can  be  enabled  in  future  mobile 
systems with the memory available in SIM cards.  The 
secure infrastructure of a future mobile network using 
public key schemes is shown in Figure 2.  The public 
key  algorithm (PKA),  such  as  RSA,  can  be  either  a 
software implementation in the SIM card or a hardware 
implementation in the mobile itself.   Furthermore, the 
PKA  should  also  be  located  either  in  the  mobile 
switching centre (MSC) or in the authentication centre 
(AUC)  for  the  subscriber’s  authentication  and  key 
distribution process.
Figure 2 – Public Key Schemes in Future Mobile 
Systems
However, public and secret key schemes involve several 
“expensive” computations such as factoring a number, 
finding  the  discrete  logarithm  of  a  number,  and 
performing  modular  exponentiation  over  finite  fields. 
An  additional  cryptographic  module  is  required  to 
perform these complex computations for the combined 
public and secret key schemes.  Addition, subtraction, 
multiplication,  modular  division,  exponentiation,  and 
logarithmic  functions  can  be  computed  in  a  crypto-
processor.   Several  secure  infrastructures  can  be 
proposed depending  on where the  crypto-processor  is 
located.  It can be located in the SIM card and/or in the 
mobile terminal itself.  
When  it  is  located  in  the  SIM  card  there  are  two 
proposed  schemes.   In  the  first  scheme,  the 
cryptographic  algorithms,  public  key  pairs,  and 
certificates can be generated offline by the manufacture, 
and uploaded to the ROM chip in a SIM card (Figure 3). 
Current  implementations  of  public  key  algorithms  in 
smart  cards  have  shown  that  the  storage  allocation 
required by the algorithms is 800 bytes (3).  A total of 4 
Kbytes  is  required  when  key  pairs  and  multiple 
certificates are included.  
Figure 3 – Secure Infrastructure using SIM Card
In this scheme, some complex computations have been 
reduced  since  public  key  pairs,  and  certificates  have 
been  generated  offline.   Authentication  is  a  one-step 
process;  certificates  can be used to  authenticate  users 
and networks.   Multiple  certificates  apply  to  multiple 
networks.  Furthermore, a session key can be generated 
by the  subscriber  and stored  temporary  in  EEPROM. 
The  subscriber  who  initiates  a  call  can  type  some 
random numbers from the keypad to generate a random 
session key just before a call is established.  Finally, in 
the session key distribution phase public key encryption 
and decryption is performed in the crypto-processor. 
In  the  second scheme,  generation of  public  key pairs 
and certificates can take place in  the mobile  terminal 
itself.  In this scheme two or more crypto processors can 
be  used  in  parallel  to  increase  the  overall  processing 
power  and  reduce  the  real  time  generation  of  keys, 
certificates,  and  public  key  encryption/decryption. 
Authentication,  key  distribution  and  session  key 
generation can follow the same principle like in the first 
scheme.   When the crypto-processor is  located in  the 
mobile terminal, there are two approaches. 
In  the  first  approach,  a  second  SIM  card  with  an 
embedded  crypto-processor  is  used  for  complex 
computations.  The cryptographic algorithms, message 
digests,  and the card’s  operating system are stored in 
ROM.  Cipher keys and random numbers are stored in 
EEPROM.  Therefore,  authentication and session key 
generation can follow the same principle like in scheme 
one.
In the second approach the crypto-processor is located 
in the baseband of the mobile terminal.  Then public key 
complex  computations  can  be  calculated  in  parallel 
from two crypto-processors based on their mathematical 
complexity.   The  cryptographic  algorithms,  message 
digests, keys and random numbers are stored in the SIM 
like the first case.  Finally, authentication and session 
key  generation  can  follow  the  same  principle  as  in 
scheme one.
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IMPLEMENTATION / RESULTS
Public  key algorithms are  divided  in two procedures; 
public  key  generation  and  public  key 
encryption/decryption.   In  order  for  the  end  user  to 
generate the public key pair, prime number generation 
must  take  place.   Generation  of  prime  numbers  is  a 
three-step process; generate a random number  p , then 
check if p  is not divisible by any small primes: 3, 5, 7, 
11 etc, and finally apply CRT.  Steps two and three can 
be  performed  simultaneously  in  two  different  crypto-
processors.  Moreover, the final public key pair usually 
results  from  modular  exponentiations  calculations  nme mod .  
Similarly, in the public key encryption and decryption 
process modular exponentiation calculations are mainly 
required.   Therefore,  modular   nmmod  and 
exponentiation  calculation   em  can  be  performed 
simultaneously.  
When two or more crypto processors are used, parallel 
processing of public key computations can be enabled 
using  the  Application  Protocol  Data  Unit  (APDU) 
protocol specified in ISO 7816-4.  The APDU protocol 
is  an  application-level  protocol  used  by  the  mobile 
terminal  to  send commands (C-APDU) in half-duplex 
mode to the SIM cards and vice-versa (R-APDU) (2). 
The C-APDU is followed by the R-APDU as illustrated 
in Figure 4a and 4b.  
  
  
CLA:      Class Instruction; ‘A0’ is used in GSM
INS:      Instruction Command
P1, P2, P3: Instruction Parameters
DATA:      Data Field 
(a) C-APDU
DATA:     Data Field
SW1:     Status Words
(b) R-APDU
Figure 4 – (a) Command APDU, (b) Response APDU
Instruction  commands  can  be  used  to  declare  the 
mathematical computation to be processed.  Moreover, 
instruction parameters can be used to assign priorities 
based on the complexity of the computations.  Complex 
computations  such  as  modular  exponentiation  can  be 
processed in the crypto-processor located in the mobile 
terminal.   Once  the  bits  in  the  data  field  have  been 
processed accordingly the results can be sent back (R-
APDU) and used by the encryption algorithms in the 
SIM card.
Nowadays, the CPU of a SIM card comprises an 8 bit 
controller in 5MHz and is in most instances a variant of 
a  6805  processor  (e.g.  Motorola,  SGS-Thomson),  a 
8051 processor (i.e. Philips, Siemens) or a manufacturer 
specific  CPU.   Furthermore,  the  CPU  of  a  mobile 
terminal comprises a 12-16 bit controller in 10MHz and 
again varies accordingly.  The results shown in Figure 5 
were obtained using Crypto-flex smart  cards (3) from 
Schlumberger.   Crypto-flex  smart  cards  have  special 
math co-processors to perform complex computations. 
The RSA public key pair used was 1024-bit.   
(a)
(b)
CLA   INS    P1    P2    P3                       DATA
                                DATA                                  SW1      SW2
(c)
(d)
Figure 6 – (a) Public key generation when crypto -
          processor is located in the SIM Card
                   (b) Public Key encryption/decryption 
                         when crypto-processor is located in 
                         the SIM Card
                   (c) Public key generation two crypto- 
                         processors are used
                   (d) Public Key encryption/decryption 
                         when two crypto-processors are used
When one crypto-processor is used, which is located in 
the  SIM  card,  public  key  generation  needs  about  9 
seconds  (Figure  6a).   On  the  other  hand,  when  two 
crypto-processors  are  used,  which  are  located  in  the 
SIM  card  and  in  the  mobile  terminal,  public  key 
generation  requires  5  seconds  only  (Figure  6c). 
Similarly, public key encryption and decryption needs 6 
and  3  seconds  with  one  or  two  crypto-processors 
respectively (Figure 6b, 6d).  
CONCLUSION
It  is  essential  to  enable  public  key schemes  in  future 
mobile  systems  to  solve  current  problems  in 
authentication  and  key  management  for  end-to-end 
security.  Several secure infrastructures were proposed 
which require additional hardware based on the location 
of  the  crypto-processors.   When  only  one  crypto-
processor is used, located in the SIM card, public key 
pair  generation needs about 9 seconds.   On the other 
hand, when two crypto-processors are used, one in the 
SIM card and the other in the mobile terminal,  public 
key pair generation requires 5 seconds only.  Similarly, 
public  key  encryption  and  decryption  needs  6  and  3 
seconds with one or two crypto-processors respectively. 
Multiple crypto-processors are necessary to reduce the 
time needed to perform public key computations.  There 
are  trade-offs,  such  as  expenses  and  power 
consumption,  between the number  and the processing 
power of crypto-processors.  The price of the SIM card 
and therefore, of a mobile phone increases dramatically 
when  a  crypto-processor  is  used.   Furthermore,  the 
power consumption of the crypto-processors with high 
processing power decreases the battery life.  However, 
two crypto-processors from 10 to 30 MHz are required 
to  enable  public  key schemes  and drop  the real  time 
encryption/decryption to 1 second.  Then, authentication 
and  key  distribution  can  take  place  in  an  acceptable 
time. 
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